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Use of Per-CPU Counters to Protect Kernel-Mode Processes on a Multicore Processor
ABSTRACT
When user and kernel mode processes are scheduled to run simultaneously on the same
physical processor core via simultaneous multithreading, processor vulnerabilities can result in
sensitive data restricted to kernel-mode processes being leaked to user-mode processes. While
disabling simultaneous multithreading or use of a scheduler that determines sequence of
execution can prevent such leakage, these changes degrade processor performance. This
disclosure describes the use of per-CPU counters to track when each physical core of a processor
begins and ends the execution of a program thread running in the kernel mode. Upon detection of
such a thread, the core is identified as being in an unsafe state and all user-mode tasks are halted
using an inter-processor interrupt.
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BACKGROUND
Many computing devices use processors that contain multiple physical cores (multicore
processors) that enable parallel execution of program threads, referred to as simultaneous
multithreading (SMT). The multiple threads typically operate in parallel on separate data.
Moreover, each physical core can be addressed as one or more virtual cores, thus enabling
additional parallelization by increasing the number of independent instructions in the processing
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pipeline. Each virtual core appears to the operating system as a separate processor, making it
feasible to schedule multiple processes for each physical processor core. Any of the processes
assigned to the virtual cores can continue to execute as long as the needed resources are
available.
Processes that execute on a processor can run in kernel or user mode depending on
whether they originated from the operating system kernel or a higher-level user application,
respectively. In execution, kernel-mode programs are treated as trusted and permitted access to
resources without restrictions. In contrast, user-mode processes are untrusted and are subject to
various restrictions that prevent them from accessing sensitive resources. However, when user
and kernel mode processes are scheduled to run at the same time on the multicore processor,
vulnerabilities in processor architecture can result in data restricted to kernel-mode processes
leaking to user-mode programs (e.g., as described in [1] [2]).
One way to avoid such security vulnerabilities is to disable SMT functionality.
Alternatively, or in addition, user-mode processes can be protected from potential attacks by
making changes to the scheduler that determines the sequence in which program instructions are
scheduled to be executed across the processor cores. Such changes can introduce bottlenecks and
lead to performance degradation.
DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes the use of per-CPU counters to track when each of the physical
cores of a processor begins and ends the execution of a program thread running in the kernel
mode. The value of the counter for each physical core is incremented whenever a kernel-mode
thread begins execution on the core and is decremented whenever the thread stops. The counter
thus helps detect whether a given physical core as a whole is performing any kernel-mode task.
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Whenever a given physical core is detected to be executing one or more kernel-mode threads, it
is deemed to be in an unsafe state that is vulnerable to attacks, e.g., originating from untrusted
user-mode programs.
Per techniques of this disclosure, Whenever a counter indicates that a physical core
switches from a safe to an unsafe state, the thread that causes the shift in the state can generate an
inter-processor interrupt (IPI) to any ongoing user-mode processes executing on the core in
parallel. Any user-mode thread that receives an IPI immediately suspends execution and waits in
a busy state until the counter indicates that the core is no longer deemed to be in the unsafe state.

Fig. 1: Inter-processor interrupt to hold execution of user-mode processes in unsafe state
Fig. 1 (a) shows a visual depiction of the techniques described in this disclosure. Each of
the processes illustrated in Fig. 1(a) is a hardware thread associated with a particular core. A
user-mode process (102) is executing on a processor core until time t1. As shown in Fig. 1 (b),
the counter value at this time is 0 since no kernel-mode processes are running. At time t1, a
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kernel-mode process (104) is scheduled to execute. To ensure security, an inter-processor
interrupt (IPI) (106) is generated to indicate that the core is entering an unsafe state, and the
counter is incremented to 1.
As Fig. 1 (b) shows, the counter is further incremented when another kernel-model
process begins executing in parallel at time t2 and is decremented when the first kernel-mode
process stops running at time t3. The entire core is deemed to be in the unsafe state (108) until
time t4 when the second kernel-mode thread stops executing after serving a soft interrupt (110).
As seen in Fig. 1(b), the counter returns to 0 at time t4 indicating that the core is no longer in the
unsafe state. At this time, the user-mode process exits waiting in the busy state (112) induced by
the IPI and continues execution from the point at which it was halted.
IPIs are sent only when a kernel-mode process results in switching the state of a core
from safe to unsafe. Such a switch results only when the core is idle or executing a user-mode
process at the time when a kernel-model process begins executing. On the other hand, if the core
is executing other kernel-mode processes, the core is already deemed to be in the unsafe state
when a new kernel-mode thread begins executing. As a result, there is no change in the state of
the core and no IPI is generated when the new kernel-mode thread begins executing. Such
operation minimizes the number of IPIs that are generated, thus reducing overhead.
Sometimes an untrusted user-level process currently executing on a physical core itself
needs to perform kernel-mode tasks which leads to the core entering an unsafe state. In such
cases, if the other core virtual cores associated with the physical core are idle (not executing any
other threads), no IPI is generated. If any other kernel-mode processes begin execution after the
user-level process begins its kernel-mode tasks, the user-level process remains waiting in busy
mode after completing its execution of kernel-mode tasks. In such cases, entering the busy mode
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does not require any IPIs and the waiting continues until all other kernel-mode processes
complete execution and the physical core returns to the safe mode.
Notably, as seen in Fig. 1(a), the described techniques ensure protection for soft
interrupts since these are nested within kernel-model processes, such as interrupt requests (IRQs)
and system calls. Moreover, Fig. 2 shows that the idle loop (114) to enter and exit the unsafe
core state is modified to ensure that the unsafe state is exited as soon as possible such that any
untrusted user-mode processes (102) that are on hold (112) are not put on hold for an
unreasonably long time.

Fig. 2: Modified idle loop to avoid unreasonable wait times for user-mode processes
Implementation of the described techniques eliminates the need to wait in a scheduling
loop when switching from a trusted task to an untrusted task within the same process. Moreover,
if a kernel-mode process begins executing when the other running threads are in trusted usermode contexts (e.g., system daemon) or in the idle state, no IPI is generated since no untrustedmode thread needs to be halted.
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Techniques described in this disclosure can be implemented in an operating system for
any device that incorporates a central processing unit (CPU) with multiple cores capable of
simultaneous multithreading. Implementation of the techniques can ensure that user mode
processes (which may be malicious) cannot access sensitive data when the processor employs
simultaneous multithreading, and that such data does not leak accidentally. The techniques
achieve such protection without requiring the simultaneous multithreading feature of the
processor to be turned off. The operation is optimized to only generate inter-processor interrupts
when necessary which improves efficiency and reduces the need to put threads in a waiting state.
As a result, the techniques can provide enhanced security with a relatively low impact on
performance.
CONCLUSION
When user and kernel mode processes are scheduled to run simultaneously on the same
physical processor core via simultaneous multithreading, processor vulnerabilities can result in
sensitive data restricted to kernel-mode processes being leaked to user-mode processes. While
disabling simultaneous multithreading or use of a scheduler that determines sequence of
execution can prevent such leakage, these changes degrade processor performance. This
disclosure describes the use of per-CPU counters to track when each physical core of a processor
begins and ends the execution of a program thread running in the kernel mode. Upon detection of
such a thread, the core is identified as being in an unsafe state and all user-mode tasks are halted
using an inter-processor interrupt. The operation is optimized to only generate inter-processor
interrupts when necessary which improves efficiency and reduces the need to put threads in a
waiting state. As a result, the techniques can provide enhanced security with a relatively low
impact on performance.
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